Richard Nixon’s Visit to China: The Turning Point in Sino-American Relations that Forever Reshaped the Geopolitical Landscape of the World
"The Chinese must Go", 1871, Thomas Nast
Anti-Chinese
Throughout the mid-1800s, racism towards Chinese immigrants was rampant throughout America. Media outlets iterated this racism in print, and the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act furthered this anti-Chinese sentiment. Racist assaults and expellings took place in an attempt to drive out Chinese-Americans from America.
"Chinese must Go", 1885, Grand Rapids Evening Leader
"The Chinese Invasion! They are Coming, 900,000 Strong." The San Francisco Examiner San Francisco, California 27 Aug 1873
"California must be all American or all Chinese. We are resolved that it shall be American, and are prepared to make it so.”
-John Bigler, California Governor, 1854
"The Yellow Terror in All His Glory", 1899 Artist Unknown
“'Uncle Sam kicks out the Chinaman” is an 1886 advertisement referring both to the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act and to the “George Dee Magic Washer,” which the machine’s manufacturers hoped would displace Chinese laundry operators." Shober & Carqueville Lith Co.
"Very early on in the history of this country, Chinese Americans were seen as a group of people we wanted to keep out."
-Grace Kao, Sociology professor at Yale University
During the 1950s, Chinese people were defined by false accusations of communist infiltration, ideologies led by Senator Joseph McCarthy. This created intense fear and paranoia of Chinese people in the United States.
“The Red Iceberg” Bryn Mawr College
“A Group of Protesters Demonstrate Holding Placards against Communist...” 1960, Getty Images / American Stock Archive / Archive Photos
"As China grew and gained more attention and influence, the treatment of Chinese and Chinese Americans became increasingly tied to the state of the U.S.-China relationship. I continued to experienced racism based on ignorance and misplaced prejudices about Chinese culture. But, as mistrust toward China and the Chinese government grew, I also witnessed a growing mistrust toward Chinese Americans."
-Dr. Chi Wang, President of the U.S.-China Policy Foundation, Interview Conducted by Shannon Tiezzi, The Diplomat
Nixon Takes Office
President Nixon's election marked 20 years of no diplomatic relations with China. He believed that opening connections with China would break international tensions, and put pressure on the Soviet Union. America was faced with intense war backlash at home, and nuclear arms threats with the Soviets.
"Nixon Answers: Why Did He Go To China?" Oral history collections of the University of Georgia, Youtube Richard Nixon Foundation
“Henry (Kissinger)feels that our whole policy and the current moves on China will help to shake the Soviets up, as will Brezhnev’s need to make a big peace move of some kind, which should play in our favor for a SALT agreement and a Summit conference.”
-Richard Nixon, April, 1971
"The front page of The Washington Post in May 1971, the day after more than 7,000 anti-Vietnam War protesters were arrested for shutting down traffic in Washington." Hannah Natanson, The Washington Post Archives
“WE WON’T FIGHT ANOTHER RICH MAN’S WAR —an anti–Vietnam War protest in the 1970s.", Public Domain, Zinn Education Project
"End the War Now!" The Detroit News Collection, Walter P. Reuther Library, Archives of Labor and Urban Affairs, Wayne State University.
"Protesters at the Jeannette Rankin Peace Parade on January 15, 1968", Associated Press Photos
“At home, you had riots, assassinations and people being disillusioned with executive power. He thought if he opened China, the huge country, the drama and the importance of dealing with the giant would put in perspective the rather messy exit from Vietnam.”
-Former U.S-China Ambassador Winston Lord
Soviet Paranoia
"Soviet and Chinese troops clash at the Ussuri River border, underlining the split in Sino-Soviet relations." Richard Nixon Foundation
In 1968, the Soviet Union and China clashed at the Ussuri River, this border dispute increased mutual mistrust. Mao became increasingly weary of potential Soviet expansionism, and clashes between Soviet and Chinese leadership further eroded their relationship.
“In Mao’s mind and the Chinese leadership’s mind they were really very concerned that this was a serious threat to them. They didn’t feel we [the Americans] were territorial… but they thought the Russians would be. This was a motivating factor.”
-Admiral Jonathan Howe, Deputy National Security Advisor.
"U.S. State Department, Bureau of Intelligence and Research: Intelligence Note, "Communist China: Peking Inflates Soviet War Threat," 3 June 1969, Secret/No Foreign Dissemination" National Archives, SN 67-69, Pol Chicom-USSR
"State Department cable 130100 to U.S. Embassy, Taipei, "Nur Khan's Meeting with Chou En-lai," 5 August 1969, Secret, Exdis" National Archives, SN 67-69, Pol-Chicom-US
"Letter from Allen S. Whiting to Henry Kissinger, 16 August 1969, enclosing report, "Sino-Soviet Hostilities and Implications for U.S. Policy" National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials Project, box 839, China
Mao's paranoia peaked at the Soviet Invasion of Czechslovakia in 1968, as well as continued nuclear arms threats.
“Peking has chosen normalization because of our strength. It is precisely your assertion of a responsible American world role and taking strong measures when necessary that has convinced the PRC that the U.S. is a useful counterweight to the Soviet menace.”
-Henry Kissinger in his 1971 Memorandum
The Chinese began looking towards the U.S as a potential counterweight to neutralize Soviet advancements.
"Soviet tanks are surrounded by crowds of Czechs protesting against the invasion on Prague's Wenceslas Square on August 21, 1968." Czech Press Agency Archives
“We also say in the same situation, that’s what your President said when he was sitting here, that each side has its own means and acted out of its own necessity. That resulted in the two countries acting hand-in-hand.”
-Chairman Mao Zedong, 1973
"Letter from Allen S. Whiting to Henry Kissinger, 16 August 1969, enclosing report, "Sino-Soviet Hostilities and Implications for U.S. Policy" National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials Project, box 839, China
“They recognize that the West, and particularly the United States, now represents not an oppressor but a protector. And they recognize their need for protection. This does not mean that the old resentments and distrusts have vanished, or that new ones will not arise. It does, however, mean that there has been an important shift in the balance of danger, and this shift has important implications for the future."
-Richard Nixon in “Asia after Vietnam”, Pg 113
"Why It Was ESSENTIAL To Open Relations With China." Oral history collections of the University of Georgia, Richard Nixon Foundation